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THE CASE AGAINST CHEVRON DEFERENCE
IN IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER†
ABSTRACT
The Duke Law Journal’s fifty-first annual administrative law
symposium examines the future of Chevron deference—the command
that a reviewing court defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute the agency administers. In the lead article,
Professors Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson argue that the
Supreme Court should narrow Chevron’s domain to exclude
interpretations made via administrative adjudication. Building on their
framing, this Article presents an in-depth case study of immigration
adjudication and argues that this case against Chevron has perhaps its
greatest force when it comes to immigration. That is because much of
Chevron’s theory for congressional delegation and judicial
deference—including agency expertise, deliberative process, and even
political accountability—collapses in the immigration adjudication
context.
As for potential reform, Professors Hickman and Nielson
understandably focus on the Supreme Court. This Article also explores
that judicial option but argues that it is a mistake to focus just on courts
when it comes to immigration law and policy. The political branches
can and should act to narrow Chevron’s domain. First, this proposal
should be part of any comprehensive immigration reform legislation.
Second, the Executive Branch can and should embrace this reform
internally—by not seeking Chevron deference in immigration
adjudication and by turning to rulemaking instead of adjudication to
make major immigration policy. Shifting the immigration
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policymaking default from adjudication to rulemaking is more
consistent with Chevron’s theoretical foundations—to leverage agency
expertise, to engage in a deliberative process, and to increase political
accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, we have seen a growing call, largely from
those right of center, to eliminate Chevron1 deference—the command
that federal courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it
administers so long as the statutory provision is ambiguous and the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.2 Those calls arrived center stage

1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 842–43. For a collection of these criticisms, see generally Christopher J. Walker,
Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103
(2018). Notably, scholarly criticisms of Chevron predate the current wave and have been lodged
by scholars across the ideological spectrum. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN.
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during the March 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on thenJudge Neil Gorsuch’s nomination to the Supreme Court. While serving
on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch had penned a concurring opinion that
questioned the constitutionality and wisdom of Chevron deference and
suggested that “[m]aybe the time has come to face the [Chevron]
behemoth.”3
Chevron deference garnered nearly one hundred mentions at
Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing.4 The senators’ opening statements are
illustrative. Senator Dianne Feinstein proclaimed that Gorsuch’s
apparent call to eliminate Chevron deference was an attack on science
and “would dramatically affect how laws passed by Congress can be
properly carried out” by federal agencies.5 Senator Amy Klobuchar
asserted that Chevron’s demise “would have titanic real-world
implications on all aspects of our everyday lives. Countless rules could
be in jeopardy, protections that matter to the American people would
be compromised, and there would be widespread uncertainty.”6 “[T]o
those who subscribe to President Trump’s extreme view,” Senator Al
Franken declared, “Chevron is the only thing standing between them
and what the President’s chief strategist Steve Bannon called the
‘deconstruction of the administrative state,’ which is shorthand for
gutting any environmental or consumer protection measure that gets
in the way of corporate profit margins.”7 In total, eight senators
mentioned Gorsuch’s views on Chevron deference during their
questioning.8 Simply put, the potential demise of Chevron deference

L. REV. 779, 782–84 (2010) (outlining ten reasons why Chevron should be overruled); Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (“The danger of Chevron’s song lies in its apparent obliviousness to the
fundamental alterations it makes in our constitutional conception of the administrative state.”).
3. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
4. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch To Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. passim (2017) [hereinafter Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing] (mentioning
the word “Chevron” ninety-four times).
5. Id. at 6–7 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
6. Id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
7. Id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Al Franken, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
8. See id. at 86–87 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); id. at 90–91, 271–73 (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary ); id. at 127–29 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 153–55, 302–03 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); id. at
159 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 174–76
(statement of Sen. Franken); id. at 201–02, 331–32 (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake, Member, S.
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was a core talking point against Gorsuch’s elevation to the Supreme
Court.
Justice Gorsuch has since finished his third full year on the
Supreme Court. Yet the Chevron revolution the senators feared has
not materialized. To the contrary, in Kisor v. Wilkie,9 the Court
rejected a challenge to eliminate Auer10 deference—a sibling doctrine
regarding judicial deference to agency regulatory interpretations.11
Despite Chief Justice John Roberts’s suggestion that Kisor’s
reaffirmance of Auer did not “touch upon the . . . question” of Chevron
deference,12 we do not expect the Court to overturn Chevron any time
soon. In our view, Auer was more susceptible to a legal challenge than
Chevron. Yet the Court did not overturn Auer when it had the chance.
Chevron should be similarly safe. Nor do we expect Congress to
eliminate Chevron deference—despite various legislative proposals to
do so in recent years.13
Although a wholesale reconsideration of Chevron deference is
unlikely in the near future, this Article returns to the context that
caused Gorsuch to express concerns about Chevron in the first place:
immigration adjudication. In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,14 the Tenth
Circuit confronted and rejected an agency statutory interpretation of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) that the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) had embraced via agency
adjudication.15 Gorsuch authored the opinion for the Tenth Circuit16

Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 216–17 (statement of Sen. Mike Crapo, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary).
9. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
10. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
11. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2422–23. To be sure, Justice Gorsuch disagreed with the 5–4 majority
and penned the principal concurring opinion, in which he argued that Auer should be replaced
with the less deferential Skidmore standard. Id. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (preferring the
standard set out in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
12. Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (casting the deciding vote to uphold Auer
deference under stare decisis).
13. See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2
(amending the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to eliminate Auer and Chevron
deference); Separation of Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 5, 115th Cong. tit. II, § 202 (2017) (same);
see also Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L.
REV. 629, 667–69 (2017) (discussing legislative efforts to eliminate or narrow Auer and Chevron
deference).
14. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
15. Id. at 1144–46.
16. Id. at 1143.
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and published a separate concurrence to observe that “[t]here’s an
elephant in the room”: Chevron deference.17
That elephant remains in the immigration courtroom. This Article
seeks to return the debate about Chevron deference to this
immigration context. To do so, it builds on the lead article in this
Symposium, in which Professors Kristin Hickman and Aaron Nielson
argue that the Supreme Court should narrow Chevron’s domain to
exclude, or at a minimum reduce, judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretations established in an administrative adjudication.18 Further,
this Article draws from important scholarship on immigration
adjudication to reassess the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of
Chevron’s domain in immigration adjudication. Ultimately, the case
against Chevron deference in administrative adjudication has perhaps
its greatest force when it comes to immigration adjudication.19
On closer examination, the theoretical foundations for Chevron
deference crumble in this context. Chevron’s core rationale for
congressional delegation and judicial deference—agency expertise—is
particularly weak in immigration adjudication. Unlike in other
regulatory contexts, the statutory ambiguities immigration
adjudicators address seldom implicate scientific or other technical
expertise. The second leading and related rationale—deliberative
process—is even weaker here than in other adjudicative contexts.
After all, immigration adjudication is on the fringe of the “new world
of agency adjudication.”20 It is not formal adjudication under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and therefore lacks many of
the signature procedural protections afforded in APA-governed

17. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
18. Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J.
931, 938 (2021).
19. Throughout this Article and unless otherwise noted, we use “agency adjudication” or
“administrative adjudication” as shorthand for any agency adjudication where a hearing is
required by statute or regulation. In other words, we are grouping together what in the literature
are referred to as Type A (APA-governed formal agency adjudication) and Type B (formal-like
agency adjudication where a hearing is required by another statute or regulation) adjudications,
and we are expressly not discussing or comparing less formal Type C adjudications where no
hearing is required. See Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of
Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 153–57 (2019) (discussing the Type A, B, and C
categorizations of agency adjudication embraced by the Administrative Conference of the United
States in Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314–15 (Dec. 23, 2016)).
20. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 154; id. at 143 (“The vast majority of agency
adjudications today, however, do not look like APA formal adjudication. Instead, agencies
regulate using adjudicatory means that still require evidentiary hearings but do not embrace all
of the features set forth in the APA.”).
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formal adjudication.21 The third central rationale—political
accountability—may at first blush seem compelling in immigration
adjudication, due to the attorney general’s final decisionmaking
authority.22 Building on Professors Hickman and Nielson’s framing,
however, we argue that agency-head review is necessary yet
insufficient for Chevron’s accountability theory. The theory should
encompass a robust public engagement component, with public notice
and an opportunity to be heard for those—beyond the parties in the
adjudication itself—who would be affected by the agency’s statutory
interpretation. Agency adjudication seldom provides that, and perhaps
even less so in immigration adjudication.
To be sure, this is not an argument for eliminating Chevron
deference entirely in the immigration context. Others have advanced
largely substantive arguments against Chevron when it comes to
interpretations that infringe on liberty, including in the refugee and
asylum context.23 Here, the argument against Chevron, by contrast, is
largely procedural, not substantive. Chevron deference should apply in
the immigration context only to agency statutory interpretations
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The
lessdeferential Skidmore24 standard should govern interpretations
advanced in immigration adjudication.25 As one of us (Wadhia) has
explored in calling for rulemaking for deferred action in immigration,
there is tremendous value in national uniformity and in public-facing
deliberative process when crafting immigration law and policy—both
of which would be inhibited if courts, as opposed to agencies, take the

21. See id. at 172. For the APA’s formal procedural requirements, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557
(2018), and Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 148–53, 150 tbl.1. For more on how
immigration adjudication differs from APA-governed formal adjudication, see MICHAEL
ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 151–58 (2019).
22. But see Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 173 (“[T]he Attorney General only
reviews cases on a discretionary basis.”).
23. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 495, 532–
33 (2019) (arguing for “a physical liberty exception to Chevron” in the immigration context);
Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71
ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 135, 189–92 (2019) (discouraging application of Chevron deference to
withholding and asylum decisions).
24. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
25. See id. at 140 (instructing courts to give “weight” to an agency’s statutory interpretation
based “upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control”).
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leading role.26 In other words, rulemaking should be the predominant
administrative tool for implementing Congress’s immigration laws and
for making immigration policy at the agency level.
There remains the issue of how to effectuate this reform.
Professors Hickman and Nielson understandably focus on the Supreme
Court,27 and this Article also discusses stare decisis and judicial action.
But for immigration law and policy, it is a mistake to focus on just
federal courts. The political branches can and should act to narrow
Chevron’s domain. First, the proposal presented here should be part of
any comprehensive immigration reform legislation. As Professor Kent
Barnett details, Congress has codified lesser deference standards for
certain agency actions28—it should do so in immigration adjudication,
too. Second, the Executive Branch can and should embrace this reform
internally by not seeking Chevron deference in immigration
adjudication and by turning to rulemaking instead of adjudication to
make major immigration policy. The Biden administration should
embrace this reform, and senators of both parties should extract this
commitment from the next attorney general nominee as part of the
confirmation process.
In other words, both political branches should work to shift the
default from adjudication to rulemaking for immigration policymaking
at the agency level. Legislatively eliminating Chevron deference for
immigration adjudication should encourage more notice-and-comment
rulemaking. But to successfully flip the default to rulemaking, the
Executive Branch likely must also commit to the reform internally. As
detailed in this Article, this shift from adjudication to rulemaking
would be more consistent with the theoretical foundations of the
Chevron doctrine—to better leverage agency expertise, to engage in a
more deliberative process, and to increase political accountability.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
immigration adjudication, including how the Supreme Court has
applied Chevron deference in the immigration context. Part II critically
examines Chevron’s theoretical foundations as applied to the
immigration adjudication context. Part III explores the mechanics of
narrowing Chevron’s domain to exclude agency statutory

26. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 85–87, 152–55 (2015) [hereinafter
WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION].
27. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 938.
28. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2015).
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interpretations advanced via immigration adjudication—suggesting
potential reforms by all three branches of the federal government.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION
Immigration decisions are made every day by a universe of people
and agencies. An officer employed by the Department of State and
situated in a U.S. consulate or embassy abroad may decide if a foreign
national is eligible for immigration status and entitled to a visa.29 A line
officer from Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) may
issue a supervision order to an immigrant during a routine check-in.30
An adjudicator in U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) may interview a couple and grant adjustment of status (a
“green card”) to the immigrant beneficiary.31 An inspector at Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”) may deport a father who arrives at a
land border without papers.32 ICE, CBP, and USCIS are units in the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and their employees are
responsible for making a range of immigration enforcement and
benefits decisions with significant impacts on immigrants and their
families.33
In fact, the majority of removal (deportation) orders issued each
year are made by DHS officers through what one of us (Wadhia) has
coined a “speedy deportation.”34 Speedy deportation refers to three
29. Consular Affairs by the Numbers, U.S. DEP’T STATE (2020), https://travel.state.gov/
content/dam/travel/CA-By-the-Number-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/94EW-LFYU]; see also U.S.
Visas, U.S. DEP’T STATE, BUREAU CONSULAR AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
us-visas.html [https://perma.cc/U47F-PSNR].
30. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE
TIME OF TRUMP 48 (2019) [hereinafter WADHIA, BANNED]; Detention Management, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (last updated Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/detentionmanagement [https://perma.cc/L9KZ-VV92].
31. See Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 25, 2020), https://
www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/adjustment-of-status [https://
perma.cc/XJP6-WBEB]; Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
green-card [https://perma.cc/S6LG-RQ8L].
32. See Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://
www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders [https://perma.cc/L33U-3TVU] (describing detection
of undocumented immigrants as a duty of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Patrol).
33. See Operational and Support Components, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (last updated
Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/operational-and-support-components [https://perma.cc/YC876TBJ].
34. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 80; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of
Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 passim (2014). For
another scholar’s discussion of expedited deportations, see Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow
Removals Collide: Searching for Solutions to the Legal Black Holes Created by Expedited Removal
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programs under the INA that authorize DHS to remove noncitizens
without a hearing or review before an immigration judge. These
programs are formally called administrative removal, expedited
removal, and reinstatement of removal.35 Last year, the Supreme Court
upheld the statutory bars to habeas review of one of these programs,
expedited removal, against a Suspension Clause constitutional
challenge—with Justice Sonia Sotomayor declaring in dissent that the
“decision handcuffs the Judiciary’s ability to perform its constitutional
duty to safeguard individual liberty and dismantles a critical
component of the separation of powers.”36
Immigration adjudications are also made by employees of the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). DOJ houses the immigration court
system known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”).37 Immigration judges at EOIR preside over removal
hearings at which a noncitizen—known as the respondent—is charged
with a violation of immigration law and a number of other hearings,
such as bond hearings and reviews of fear determinations made by
DHS.38 As Part I.A details, the attorney general and the BIA exercise
agency appellate review over immigration judge decisions.
This Article focuses on one strand of immigration adjudication:
removal proceedings before DOJ’s immigration courts, the BIA, and
the attorney general. Part I.A provides an overview of that system, and
Part I.B explains how federal courts have applied Chevron deference
to statutory interpretations embraced via immigration adjudication.

and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 337, 341 (2018), and Jennifer Lee Koh & Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Opinion, Deport, Not Court? The U.S. Is Already Doing That, L.A. TIMES
(June 30, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-koh-wadhiadeportations-20180630-story.html [https://perma.cc/UK7K-Q4K4].
35. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 30, at 79.
36. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1993 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
37. About the Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office [https://perma.cc/TNZ3-WTG7].
38. PLANNING, ANALYSIS & STAT. DIV. OF THE EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T
JUST., STATISTICS YEARBOOK: FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 4–6, 15 tbl.6 (2018) [hereinafter 2018
STATISTICS YEARBOOK], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/
6UN5-4WJ2].

WADHIA WALKER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1206

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/19/2021 5:11 PM

[Vol. 70:1197

A. Immigration Adjudication Process
Most immigration cases at EOIR involve people in removal
proceedings,39 which are triggered when a charging document called
the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) is filed with the immigration court.40 A
number of DHS employees—attorneys and nonattorneys alike—can
issue an NTA.41 The NTA contains information that includes notice
about the location and time of a court proceeding and the reasons a
person is alleged to be in violation of immigration law.42
In removal proceedings, trial attorneys from ICE represent the
government and act as “prosecutors.”43 Respondent noncitizens
represent themselves pro se or are represented by an attorney or
accredited representative.44 Removal hearings are adversarial, but the
proceedings themselves are “civil,” not “criminal.”45 Unlike the

39. In fiscal year 2018, 182,010 of the 195,213 cases (93.2 percent) completed by the EOIR
involved removal proceedings. Id. at 12 tbl.5.
40. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13–1003.15 (2020); see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL & CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L., NOTICES TO APPEAR:
LEGAL CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES 2 (2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/
76BC-Y3KM].
41. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (listing the types of immigration officers with authority to
issue a Notice to Appear); CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AT THE PA. STATE UNIV.
DICKINSON SCH. OF L. & COMM’N ON IMMIGR. OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N, TO FILE OR NOT TO
FILE A NOTICE TO APPEAR: IMPROVING THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION 13–18 (2013), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/
NTAReportFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/96FH-ZWMZ].
42. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2018) (listing
information required in a Notice to Appear); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15.
43. See Attorney, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (last updated Aug. 5, 2020), https://
www.ice.gov/careers/attorney [https://perma.cc/5HYT-FF84].
44. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5.
45. This technical distinction is the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky,
The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (noting the displacement of “the civil regulatory model of
immigration law” with a “criminal justice model”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the CivilCriminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal
Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 289 (2008) (“[R]emoval and traditional criminal
proceedings . . . can be indistinguishable but for the relative lack of procedural protections and
the often graver liberty interest at stake in the former.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That
Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1822, 1824–26 (2011) (critiquing the civil–criminal line in the preemption
context); see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE: HOW THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM FALLS SHORT OF AMERICAN IDEALS OF JUSTICE 1–2 (2013), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aic_twotwosystemsofjust.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6WS-RVQD] (“Although immigration law is formally termed ‘civil,’
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criminal justice system, in removal proceedings there is no right to a
grand jury, speedy trial, court-appointed counsel, or mandated
timeframe during which an immigrant must see a judge.46
The immigration court has two dockets: one for respondents
outside of detention and a second for those detained.47 The
adjudicative process begins with the “master calendar hearing,” when
an immigration judge may ask the respondent if she needs more time
to find counsel or to respond to the charges of the NTA.48 If the
respondent concedes to removability or the immigration judge finds
the same, the next stage of removal proceedings often involves the
respondent applying for relief from removal. Respondents seek such
relief at a stage in the removal process known as the “individual merits
hearing,” or the “merits hearing.” These are evidentiary hearings at
which both the government and the respondent may present evidence
and witness testimony, including testimony of the respondent herself.49
The various forms of relief act as “defenses” to removal and include
asylum, cancellation of removal, and waivers from inadmissibility.50 In
removal proceedings, the respondent bears the burden of proving
eligibility for relief.51 For example, an asylum seeker must prove to an
immigration judge that she has suffered persecution or has a fear of
future persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.52 While

Congress has progressively expanded the number of crimes that may render an individual
deportable, and immigration law violations often lead to criminal prosecutions.”).
46. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 7–10; WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION,
supra note 26, at 52; Legomsky, supra note 45, at 511–18.
47. Detention Management, supra note 30.
48. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., REPRESENTING CLIENTS AT THE MASTER CALENDAR
HEARING 1 (2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rep_clnts_mstr_cal_hearing20181220.pdf [https://perma.cc/36TK-P3SM]; Immigration Judge Master Calendar Checklist for
Pro Se Respondents, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/page/file/924091/download [https://perma.cc/E7EF-LTC6].
49. See INA § 240(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2018) (prescribing the form of these proceedings);
see also OFF. OF THE CHIEF IMMIGR. JUDGE OF THE EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T
JUST., IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 80 (2020) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL],
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download [https://perma.cc/9Y9F-6APZ].
50. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in
Immigration Cases, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 377 (2020).
51. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (c)(4)(a).
52. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2020).
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immigrants in removal proceedings speak multiple languages, all forms
they must fill out are available in English only.53
The INA provides a statutory right to counsel in removal
proceedings at no expense to the government.54 Many immigrants in
removal proceedings are unable to access or pay for a lawyer and so
must navigate the process without one.55 Detained immigrants are
dramatically more likely to face immigration court alone.56 Although
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach in these
proceedings, the Fifth Amendment right to due process applies, such
that removal proceedings must be fundamentally fair.57 The INA
provides additional rights during removal proceedings, including the
right to present evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses
and evidence.58 In removal proceedings, respondents also have the
right to an interpreter.59
Immigration judges play a significant role during removal
proceedings. They ask questions of the parties. They make decisions
about whether to continue, terminate, or close a proceeding.60 They
also decide a respondent’s eligibility for relief from removal, which
may be delivered in writing or orally.61 Once the judge hands down her

53. See, e.g., EOIR-29, Notificación de Apelación Ante la Junta de Apelaciones de
Inmigración Sobre una Decisión de un Oficial de Inmigración, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (last updated June 12, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/es/eoir-29 [https://perma.cc/773PEEUE] (providing only English-language forms on the Spanish-language website).
54. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362.
55. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) (finding “that only 37% of immigrants had
counsel” in immigration proceedings from 2007 to 2012); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration
Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 46 (2010) (noting detainees’ limited access to
attorneys (citing Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens:
Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1651–52 (1997))).
56. Who Is Represented in Immigration Court?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/485 [https://perma.cc/9AYU-74HB].
57. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); Note, A Second
Chance: The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1544, 1548–49 (2007) (collecting cases on the lack of a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in removal proceedings).
58. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4).
59. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 49, at 64; Cristobal Ramón & Lucas Reyes, Language
Access in the Immigration System: A Primer, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://
bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/language-access-in-the-immigration-system-a-primer [https://perma.cc/
YQG5-GUR9].
60. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.10(b), 1240.12 (2020).
61. Id.
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decision, the respondent or ICE trial attorney may appeal to the BIA.62
Unlike immigration courts, which are sprinkled throughout the
country, the BIA is housed in one building in Falls Church, Virginia.63
Importantly, appeals must be made within thirty days of the
immigration judge’s decision.64 Because a formal transcript of the
hearing can be mailed later than thirty days after the decision, the
respondent and counsel, if any, must pay close attention during the oral
hearing.
Appeals to the BIA are common. And yet, most decisions are not
appealed by either party.65 For respondents, filing an appeal can be
expensive or could mean that they remain in detention pending appeal.
Absent an appeal, the immigration judge’s decision is “final” and may
result in the immigrant obtaining relief or a formal order of removal.66
If an appeal is filed, a decision by the BIA to affirm a removal order
constitutes the final order of removal.67 At this point, the BIA may
publish its decision as precedential, which means it is legally binding on
other immigration adjudications.68 More often, BIA decisions are
unpublished and thus nonprecedential69—and issued by a single judge
or panel without the same binding nature.70 When making decisions,

62. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1–1003.8 (describing the process to appeal to the BIA from
immigration judges’ decisions in removal proceedings).
63. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last
updated May 30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://
perma.cc/DWK3-SK8N].
64. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.15.
65. Compare 2018 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 38, at 7 fig.2 (indicating 195,571
matters completed in fiscal year 2018), with id. at 35 fig.27 (noting 49,522 appeals received by the
BIA the same year).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (implementing INA § 101(a)(47)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)
(2018)).
67. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(7), 1241.1.
68. Id. § 103.10(b) (“Selected decisions designated by the Board, decisions of the Attorney
General, and decisions of the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . shall serve as precedents in all
proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”).
69. Of the 29,788 cases completed by the BIA in 2018, only twenty-three resulted in
precedential opinions. Compare 2018 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 38, at 35 fig.27
(indicating the number of cases completed in 2018), with Volume 27, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF.
FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated June 12, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-27 [https://
perma.cc/AMT9-32JF] (listing precedential opinions).
70. See, e.g., David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177,
1205 (2016) (noting the BIA’s more recent practice of permitting single members to issue singlesentence affirmances with no reasoning and therefore no precedential value); see also infra note
179 (discussing number of precedential decisions issued in the Trump administration).
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BIA members are required by regulation to exercise “independent
judgment and discretion.”71
The regulations allow the attorney general to certify a decision by
the BIA and issue a new decision.72 The reality is that attorney general
decisions are legally binding,73 with little to no regard for the stature of
precedent. To illustrate, in Matter of L-E-A-,74 then-Attorney General
William Barr announced a new position for asylum claims based on
family relationships.75 In general, asylum applicants must show they
have suffered persecution in the past or have a well-founded fear of
future persecution for one of five reasons: race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.76 And
historically, the federal government and federal courts have recognized
that family can be a particular social group.77 Barr was critical of the
BIA’s 2017 decision in Matter of L-E-A- because it “improperly
recognized the respondent’s father’s immediate family as a ‘particular
social group.’”78
The case involved a Mexican national and citizen who feared
persecution from a criminal gang because of his relationship to his
father.79 His father operated a neighborhood general store targeted by
a drug cartel.80 The respondent’s father refused to allow the drug cartel
to operate out of his general store, which the respondent believed to
be the reason his father became a target.81 Barr did not agree that the
respondent’s family relationship qualified as a “social group,” and he

71. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).
72. Id. § 103.10(c).
73. Id. § 103.10(b).
74. In re L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (Att’y Gen. 2019).
75. Id. at 581.
76. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that
“every circuit to have considered the question has held that family ties can provide a basis for
asylum” and collecting BIA opinions which held the same); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36
(1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common,
identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”); In re Acosta, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985) (recognizing that “membership in a particular social group” can
be based on “kinship ties”), abrogated on other grounds by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987), as recognized in In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re H-, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 337, 342–43 (B.I.A. 1985) (finding a Somalian subclan to be a “particular social group” linked
by kinship ties and “identifiable as a group based upon linguistic commonalities”).
78. L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 583.

WADHIA WALKER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/19/2021 5:11 PM

2021] CHEVRON FOR IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION

1211

held that “most nuclear families are not inherently socially distinct and
therefore do not qualify as ‘particular social groups.’”82 Critics of
Matter of L-E-A- argued that Barr’s decision undermined the body of
caselaw that recognized individuals like the respondent.83 And yet,
Barr’s decision is now legally binding and informs and limits the ability
for asylum seekers to seek protection based on a family relationship.
Attorney general certification rulings pervaded decisionmaking
during the Trump administration. As of this writing, there have been
fourteen attorney general certification rulings.84 Fourteen might
appear to be a small number, but equally important to the number of
certifications is the scope of the decisions and erosion of BIA
precedent. Professor Richard Frankel showcases how certification
spiked during the Trump administration and argues these decisions
should not receive Chevron deference.85 Says Professor Frankel:
[The Attorney General] has imposed new restrictions that deprive
victims of domestic violence and gang threats from seeking asylum,
revoked the authority of immigration judges to put deportation cases
on hold or grant continuances while non-citizens await decisions on
applications for relief from deportation, and ordered increased

82. Id. at 581.
83. See supra note 77; see also Jeffrey S. Chase, L-E-A-: How Much Did the AG Change?,
JEFFREY S. CHASE BLOG (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/8/11/l-e-ahow-much-did-the-ag-change [https://perma.cc/SW62-AUUX] (criticizing Barr’s attempt to
overhaul decades’ worth of caselaw).
84. Since 2017, the attorney general has issued precedential decisions in fourteen certified
cases: In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018); In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316
(Att’y Gen. 2018); In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405 (Att’y Gen. 2018); In re S-O-G- & F-D-B, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462 (Att’y Gen. 2018); In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (Att’y Gen. 2019); L-E-A, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581; In re Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664 (Att’y Gen. 2019); In re Thomas &
Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 674 (Att’y Gen. 2019); In re R-A-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778 (Att’y Gen.
2020); In re O‑F‑A‑S‑, 28 I. & N. Dec. 35 (Att’y Gen. 2020); In re Reyes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 52 (Att’y
Gen. 2020); In re A-C-A-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 84 (Att’y Gen. 2020); and In re Negusie, 28 I. & N.
120 (Att’y Gen. 2020).
85. Richard Frankel, Deporting Chevron: Why the Attorney General’s Immigration Decisions
Should Not Receive Chevron Deference 5, 7, 33 (Drexel Univ. Sch. of L., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 2019-W-02), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492115 [https://perma.cc/
3RXT-B726]. Professor Frankel is not alone in his concerns. See, e.g., WADHIA, BANNED, supra
note 30, at 58–59 (discussing increased use of the certification power under the Trump
administration); Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L.
REV. ONLINE 129, 131 (2017) (discussing the disruptive nature of the certification power and
arguing that its use undermines uniformity within the law). Part II returns to Professor Frankel’s
arguments against Chevron deference to attorney general decisions.
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imprisonment of non-citizens and reduced immigration judges’
authority to grant bond, among other rulings.86

Similarly, Professor Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer and attorney Hillary
Rich have argued against Chevron deference in connection with Matter
of A-B-.87 There, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a decision
involving an asylum seeker who claimed she was persecuted on account
of her membership in the purported particular social group of
“Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic
relationships where they have children in common.”88 In adopting
Matter of A-B-, Sessions also overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-,89 a
precedential decision from 2014.90 Building on more than a decade of
jurisprudence, Matter of A-R-C-G- was a signature precedential
decision that clearly recognized domestic violence as a basis for
asylum.91 Professor Kelley-Widmer and Rich argue, for instance, that
Matter of A-B- fails Chevron’s first step because its focus on the
potential size of the social group and the role of private actors as the
source of persecution are contrary to unambiguous congressional
intent.92 They also argue the decision fails Chevron’s second step
“because it contravenes Congressional intent regarding flexibility.”93
B. Judicial Review and Chevron Deference
Immigrants can challenge final removal decisions from the BIA or
the attorney general by filing a petition for review in a federal circuit
court. But there is a catch. The INA categorically bars certain cases
from federal court review.94 Judicial review is precluded for those with
removal orders stemming from certain criminal activity or the denial

86. Frankel, supra note 85, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
87. In re A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (Att’y Gen. 2021); Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer & Hillary Rich,
A Step Too Far: Matter of A-B-, “Particular Social Group,” and Chevron, 29 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 345, 351–53, 363 (2019) (discussing A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316).
88. Id. at 351–53, 363 (quoting A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 321).
89. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
316.
90. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
91. See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–93 (holding “married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship” can be a particular social group “dependent upon the
particular facts and evidence in a case”).
92. Kelley-Widmer & Rich, supra note 87, at 394.
93. Id. at 399.
94. INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2018).
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of relief from removal the INA has categorized as discretionary.95
Similar to the trend in administrative appeals to the BIA, the number
of immigrants who could seek federal court review far exceeds the
number of immigrants who actually do seek such review.96 Again, the
expense of filing a petition, access to legal counsel, and the narrow,
thirty-day window to file the petition are some of the barriers that limit
federal court review.97 Thus, any project assessing the intra-agency
effects of Chevron deference in immigration adjudication is limited by
the fact that most cases never make it to federal court. Notably, cases
involving asylum, legal questions, or constitutional claims are among
those accepted by federal courts, with federal circuit courts having
exclusive jurisdiction over removal orders.98
Just three years after deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court in INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca99 applied the Chevron deference framework to a
BIA statutory interpretation.100 Yet the Court ultimately did not defer
to the agency, finding instead that the statutory text unambiguously
foreclosed the BIA’s interpretation.101 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Antonin Scalia argued that “there is simply no need and thus
no justification for a discussion of whether the interpretation is entitled
to [Chevron] deference.”102 Since Cardoza-Fonseca was decided, as
Professors Hickman and Nielson document,103 the Supreme Court has
applied the Chevron deference framework to seven BIA statutory
interpretations. The agency won because of Chevron deference in
three cases.104 And the Court refused to defer in three cases because

95. Id. See generally Wadhia, supra note 50 (surveying the various ways the government uses
discretion in the immigration context).
96. See, e.g., Hausman, supra note 70, at 1196 (“Petitions for review of final removal orders
are rare events, and reversal of the BIA’s decisions is even rarer. Before the 2002 streamlining at
the BIA, fewer than 5% of all cases resulted in a petition for review” in a federal circuit court,
“and of those, fewer than 1 in 10 resulted in a remand.” (footnotes omitted)).
97. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: HOW TO FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW
5 (2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/how_
to_file_a_petition_for_review_2015_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA6F-XS7D].
98. INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
99. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
100. Id. at 446–48.
101. Id. at 448–49.
102. Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, app. at 1000–13.
104. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56–58 (2014) (plurality opinion); id. at 76
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591
(2012); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–33 (1999).
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the statute was unambiguous105 and in a fourth because the agency
asserted it had no discretion to interpret the statute differently.106
In one immigration adjudication case, a dozen years after
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[i]t is clear that
principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory
scheme.”107 In other words, the Court has not treated immigration
adjudication as exceptional for the purposes of Chevron deference.
Instead, it insists that the same doctrinal framework applicable to other
agency statutory interpretations applies with equal force to BIA
statutory interpretations. The story among the federal courts of
appeals is similar. In a recent study covering roughly a decade of
Chevron decisions, the circuit courts reviewed 386 BIA statutory
interpretations, upholding the BIA’s interpretation 70.2 percent of the
time.108
II. CHEVRON’S PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION
IN IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION
The Chevron decision has been on the books for more than thirtyfive years and is cited by more than 90,000 sources on Westlaw, but its
theoretical underpinnings remain disputed and underdeveloped.109 To
be sure, the Supreme Court has grounded Chevron in congressional
delegation—“a ‘presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a
statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree
of discretion the ambiguity allows.’”110 And this delegation theory,

105. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113–14 (2018); Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137
S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1989 (2015).
106. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514, 521 (2009).
107. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.
108. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1, 36 (2017).
109. When referencing the theory of Chevron deference, we refer to both the reasons the
Supreme Court offered for deference in the Chevron decision itself and the various theoretical
justifications for the Chevron doctrine that have since emerged in the literature and subsequent
judicial decisions. See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker,
Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1475–82 (2018) (providing an
overview of the theory of Chevron deference and some of its criticisms); Evan J. Criddle,
Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1283–91 (2008) (surveying rationales for Chevron
deference).
110. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)
(quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)).
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which the Court has suggested though never fully developed, is
grounded in the four rationales of expertise, deliberative process,
political accountability, and national uniformity of law.111 In other
words, in the Court’s view, these are the four core reasons why
Congress delegates—or at least should delegate—policymaking or lawimplementation authority to federal agencies, rather than courts.
Likewise, these rationales are also why federal agencies should receive
judicial deference, within the bounds of reasonableness, for how they
interpret these delegation-conferring statutory ambiguities.
This Part interrogates these four delegation values in the context
of immigration adjudication. As the Chevron Court instructed, this
analysis is necessarily comparative—that is, it involves weighing
whether these values are better realized by agencies or courts. Because
the argument here is that immigration agencies should receive Chevron
deference in rulemaking but not adjudication, the analysis must also
compare these two modes of agency action. This Part begins with, and
focuses most on, the values of comparative expertise and deliberative
process, as they are particularly lacking on the agency side in the
context of immigration adjudication. This Part then turns briefly to the
other two rationales of political accountability and uniformity in law.
A. Expertise
The predominant delegation theory that motivates Chevron
deference is the comparative expertise held by federal agencies—as
compared to courts—to fill gaps in statutes the agencies administer.
Concluding that “[j]udges are not experts in the field,” the Chevron
Court distinguished the role of judges from the expertise held by
federal agencies.112 As Professor Adam Cox explains in the
immigration context, “Chevron deference is often defended on the
ground that administrative agencies have greater expertise and more
democratic accountability than courts.”113
Although the Chevron Court itself did not engage in a robust
discussion of this expertise theory, it did surmise that Congress perhaps
111. See Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1475–82 (exploring these four rationales of Chevron
deference).
112. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). See
generally Sidney Shapiro & Elizabeth Fisher, Chevron and the Legitimacy of “Expert” Public
Administration, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465 (2013) (conceptualizing expertise and
accountability based on institutional perspectives and the behavior of public administrations).
113. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671,
1682 (2007). Part II.C further discusses the accountability rationale.
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“consciously desired the [agency] to strike the balance at this level,
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility
for administering the provision would be in a better position to do
so.”114 In other words, expertise seems to refer to comparative policy
expertise, including the scientific, technical, economic, or other
subject-matter expertise relevant to filling gaps in statutes the
particular agency administers.115 As attorney Paul Chaffin puts it,
“When agencies answer technical questions dealing with scientific or
economic subject matter, courts are poorly positioned to second-guess
those determinations. Judges typically do not have the extensive
scientific background possessed by appointed experts in specialty
agencies.”116 Attorney Joel Cohen employs truck driving as an
example: “Do we really want judges who have never driven a truck and
know nothing much about truck driving making decisions about truck
driving safety?”117 This conception of expertise as a rationale for
congressional delegation finds empirical support from congressional
drafters.118
The agency’s familiarity with the legislative process and purposes
that led to the statutory ambiguities at issue may also contribute to its
expertise. As Justice Scalia wrote, “The cases, old and new, that accept
administrative interpretations, often refer to the ‘expertise’ of the
agencies in question, their intense familiarity with the history and
purposes of the legislation at issue, their practical knowledge of what
will best effectuate those purposes.”119 Justice Stephen Breyer has
114. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
115. See, e.g., Paul Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does
Chevron Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 525–41
(2013) (considering BIA expertise and its implications for Chevron deference); Sweeney, supra
note 23, at 174–78 (arguing that agency expertise is not a strong rationale for Chevron deference
in the immigration context).
116. Chaffin, supra note 115, at 532.
117. Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner & Jed S. Rakoff, Judges v. Bureaucrats: Who Should
Defer to Whom?, SLATE (Oct. 18, 2017, 2:12 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/
two-judges-explain-why-they-dont-buy-the-logic-of-chevron-deference.html [https://perma.cc/
APC8-YQ5D].
118. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 1004, 1005 fig.11 (2013) (reporting that 93 percent of congressional drafters surveyed
indicated an agency’s area of expertise mattered as to whether Congress intends for an agency to
resolve a statutory ambiguity); accord Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1053 fig.10 (2015) (reporting similar findings from agency
rule drafters).
119. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 514.
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made a similar observation, noting that “[t]he agency that enforces the
statute may have had a hand in drafting its provisions,” “may possess
an internal history in the form of documents or ‘handed-down oral
tradition’ that casts light on the meaning of a difficult phrase or
provision,” and, with “its staff, in close contact with relevant legislators
and staffs, likely understands current congressional views, which, in
turn,
may,
through
institutional
history,
reflect
prior
understandings.”120
In the rulemaking context, Professor Sidney Shapiro has
reconceptualized agency expertise as “craft expertise”—what he
presents as the unique “institutional expertise of agencies.”121 This
conception of expertise has two related features. First, agency officials
of various backgrounds acquire through regulating certain expertise
outside of their trained disciplines, which “facilitates a richer,
discursive decision-making process in which persons trained in various
disciplines interact with each other inside and outside of the agency to
debate and dispute arguments and information put forward in the
rulemaking process.”122 Second, agency officials “develop expertise in
reconciling and accounting for conflicting evidence and arguments,
disciplinary perspectives, political demands, and legal commands.”123
“This expertise is a ‘craft’ form of expertise,” Shapiro explains,
“because it is learned more from experience than from formal
knowledge and because it is beyond the disciplinary training of
individual professionals.”124
The following Sections explore these three conceptions of agency
expertise in turn, finding that all three lack salience in the immigration
adjudication context.
1. Scientific or Technical Expertise. In many regulatory contexts,
it is quite easy to discern the scientific or technical expertise an agency
120. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
368 (1986) (emphasis omitted); see also Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 1377, 1382–97 (2017) (documenting the role of federal agencies in the legislative
process).
121. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure To Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The
Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015). Professor Shapiro
borrows and expands on Professor Jerry Mashaw’s observation that some of the expertise in
public administration “resides in what one might call the feel or craft of decisionmakers.” See id.
at 1113 (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 67 (1983)).
122. Id. at 1099.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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can leverage to fill the gaps in its statutory mandates. Environmental,
energy, infrastructure, financial services, and food and drug law come
immediately to mind. Yet, as Professor Hickman observes, “other
areas of administrative law where Chevron regularly applies, such as
immigration . . . , do not require scientific or other technical training.”125
Indeed, Professor Maureen Sweeney effectively contrasts the role
of technical or scientific expertise at the EPA, the agency at issue in
Chevron itself, with the lack of any such expertise required in
immigration adjudication:
The expertise required to interpret the INA, however, does not
require familiarity with technical or scientific information, nor with
the workings of an industry, nor even, for the most part, with the
mechanics of immigration enforcement. And though immigration
decisions are sometimes said to implicate delicate matters of foreign
relations, the truth of the matter is that it is the very unusual case that
affects anyone or anything other than the parties themselves. The vast
majority of immigration cases require expertise, not in foreign affairs,
but rather in the legal interpretation of a complex statutory and
regulatory scheme. This demands expertise in legal analysis and the
application of law to facts—precisely the sort of expertise that federal
courts have.126

Sweeney extensively explores the lack of scientific or technical
expertise implicated by the statutory ambiguities the BIA resolves.127
Without regurgitating that analysis here, the point is not that
interpreting the INA would never benefit from expertise in
immigration, human rights, foreign affairs, or related substantive fields.
It just turns out, as Sweeney documents, that the vast majority of
ambiguities in the INA concern purely legal questions, as opposed to
those implicating some sort of substantive expertise.
In fact, the agency’s own hiring requirements for adjudicators
reveal the agency’s determination that such substantive experience is
not required. For example, a typical announcement for a BIA member
position from 2018 describes the required experience as follows:

125. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1599 (2006) (emphasis added).
126. Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–75; see also Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in
the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 806
(1997).
127. See Sweeney, supra note 23, at 174–78.
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Applicants must have a full seven (7) years of post-bar experience as
a licensed attorney preparing for, participating in, and/or appealing
formal hearings or trials involving litigation and/or administrative law
at the Federal, State or local level. Qualifying litigation experience
involves cases in which a complaint was filed with a court, or a
charging document (e.g., indictment or information) was issued by a
court, a grand jury, or appropriate military authority. Qualifying
administrative law experience involves cases in which a formal
procedure was initiated by a governmental administrative body.128

Job announcements for immigration judges similarly do not require
any legal or policy expertise in immigration or foreign relations, or any
other scientific or technical expertise.129 Either litigation or
administrative law experience is required, but neither of those is the
type of expertise that courts or scholars have recognized as grounds for
Chevron deference.130
Another way to assess if statutory interpretation via immigration
adjudication requires some sort of technical or scientific expertise is to
examine the circuit court cases in which the courts refused to apply
Chevron deference. One of us (Wadhia) represents immigrants before
agency adjudicators and federal courts and has followed a body of
significant cases in the Third Circuit, where she regularly practices.
Those immigration adjudication cases reveal the lack of expertise at
the agency level.131 To illustrate how a court’s rejection of deference
plays into agency expertise, consider the case of Da Silva v. Attorney
General.132 Ludimilla Ramos Da Silva is a native of Brazil who was

128. E.g., Appellate Immigration Judge (Board Member), U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 21, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/appellate-immigration-judge-board-member [https://
perma.cc/K5XY-ZH3S]
129. E.g., Immigration Judge, USA JOBS, https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/
570894500 [https://perma.cc/ZU5H-49D7]; Immigration Judge (Elizabeth), U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/job/immigration-judge-elizabeth-0 [https://
perma.cc/H4WB-7ECX].
130. By pointing out the absence of immigration experience in job descriptions, we do not
intend to suggest that all individuals who hold these positions lack immigration law experience or
otherwise are not qualified to serve in these roles. Indeed, many former and sitting immigration
judges and BIA members have extensive immigration expertise.
131. See, e.g., Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2016) (declining to use
Chevron deference because the BIA’s conclusion that “failure to ‘include the specific date, time,
or place of hearing’ in a NTA has no bearing on a notice recipient’s removability” conflicted with
the INA’s plain text); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603–09 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that the BIA requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity” are not entitled to
Chevron deference due to inconsistencies between the BIA requirement and past BIA decisions).
132. Da Silva v. Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 629 (3d Cir. 2020).
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admitted to the United States in 1994 and married Aziim Leach, a U.S.
citizen, in 2012.133 As the Third Circuit recounted, Leach “subjected Da
Silva to emotional, psychological, and physical abuse throughout their
marriage.”134 During one of Leach’s numerous extramarital affairs, Da
Silva twice struck Leach’s mistress in the nose and pleaded guilty to
two counts of assault.135
The INA prohibits the cancellation of removal, under the
Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), for an immigrant
imprisoned for 180 or more days unless the “act or conviction was
connected to the alien’s having been battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty.”136 Despite the qualifying criminal offense, Da Silva argued she
was entitled to protection under VAWA cancellation because her
assault was “connected to” Leach’s abuse of her.137 The Third Circuit
agreed with Da Silva and took the extraordinary step of refusing to
remand to the agency.138 After all, the BIA decision in this case was
nonprecedential and thus not entitled to Chevron deference; on
remand, the BIA could have reexamined the statutory question and
issued a Chevron-eligible, precedential decision.
But the Third Circuit refused to remand because it found the
statutory language “connected to” unambiguous at Chevron’s first
step, leaving the agency with no discretion.139 Relevant here, the Third
Circuit also stated it was “not convinced that the Chevron framework
applies here because interpreting ‘connected to’ does not implicate the
BIA’s ‘expertise in a meaningful way’”; this was not the first time the
Third Circuit had noted the BIA’s lack of expertise in interpreting the
INA.140 Da Silva illustrates how technical expertise in immigration
law—or any other special or scientific expertise—is not required to
interpret most provisions of the INA in the context of adjudicating
immigration removal cases. In the particular case of Da Silva, as in
many others, the circuit court did not even rely on immigration sources
to determine the definition of a statutory term.
This observation is not merely anecdotal, nor is it limited to the
Third Circuit. For example, one of us (Walker) has reviewed every
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(C) (2018)).
Id.
See id. at 638.
Id. at 634–35.
Id. at 635 (quoting Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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circuit court decision that cites Chevron deference during an elevenyear period.141 A main takeaway from that empirical study is that
circuit courts are less deferential to agency statutory interpretations
made via immigration adjudication than in other adjudicative contexts.
In particular, the BIA’s win rate—70.2 percent—was nearly fifteen
percentage points less than the agency win rate for statutory
interpretations embraced in all other hearing-based agency
adjudications in the dataset—84.7 percent.142 To be sure, it is not just
about agency win rates, but whether the circuit court refuses to apply
the Chevron deference framework at all: “[I]f the 386 immigration
adjudications were removed from the formal adjudication category,
the frequency of applying Chevron deference to formal adjudications
would rise nearly ten percentage points to 85.2% and bring the formal
formats into closer parity.”143
2. Legislative Expertise. There is another type of expertise that
merits attention—namely, the expertise derived from the principal–
agent relationship between Congress and the agency. As Professor
Peter Strauss explains, “The enduring and multifaceted character of
the agency’s relationship with Congress” is that the agency has
comparative expertise “to distinguish reliably those considerations that
served to shape the legislation, the legislative history wheat, from the
more manipulative chaff.”144 If the goal of statutory interpretation is to
be a faithful agent of Congress, agencies may have more expertise than
courts, as they are more familiar with their statutory schemes and the
legislative process that led to the ambiguities in those statutory
mandates. As Professor Ganesh Sitaraman observes, the agency may
well “have special insight into what the goals and intentions behind the
legislation actually were, what the political and practical compromises
were, and how [the members of Congress] thought about specific

141. Barnett & Walker, supra note 108, at 27.
142. Id. at 36.
143. Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). These findings suggest that federal courts perhaps share this
skepticism about the BIA’s substantive expertise in interpreting the INA. To be sure, these
findings arguably also suggest that at least the circuit courts have already recalibrated the Chevron
standard in the immigration adjudication context. Although assessing that argument exceeds this
Article’s ambitions, courts “simply ignoring Chevron,” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121
(2018) (Alito, J., dissenting), is not a viable long-term solution in the immigration adjudication
context.
144. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read:
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 347
(1990).
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problems throughout the legislative process.”145 As one of us (Walker)
explores elsewhere, federal agencies are substantially involved in the
legislative drafting process and, indeed, play a role in drafting and
reviewing nearly every legislative action that may affect them.146
An agency, however, is a “they,” not an “it.” This specialized
knowledge of legislative purpose and process should only matter, from
a Chevron-expertise perspective, if the agency statutory interpreter
possesses that expertise—either directly because the interpreter
helped draft the statute or indirectly because the interpreter interacts
with the agency personnel who possess that expertise, such as “the
relevant agency rule drafters, the policy and legislative affairs teams,
the scientists and economists where applicable, and so forth.”147 As one
of us (Walker) has explored empirically, the interaction between
relevant agency legislative experts and agency rule drafters who
interpret statutes via rulemaking is often quite strong at many agencies,
supporting the agency expertise rationale for Chevron deference in the
rulemaking context.148
With respect to agency adjudication, it is far less clear that the
agency statutory interpreters have any access to the agency’s deep
expertise in the statute’s legislative history, purposes, and processes.
Most agency adjudicators, by statute or regulation, are prohibited from
engaging in ex parte communications as part of most agencies’ strong
separation of adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions—though
Professor Michael Asimow observes that “[e]x parte advice to
decisionmakers by non-adversarial agency staff members is customary
and appropriate, so long as it does not violate the exclusive record
principle by introducing new factual material.”149 In the immigration
adjudication context, it does not appear that the BIA consults with
agency legislative experts when interpreting the INA. It is doubtful that
any such expertise-sharing activity takes place, which severely
undercuts this second type of comparative agency expertise argument
for Chevron deference.
Unlike the BIA, where sharing expertise would be difficult in light
of the agency’s current structure, the attorney general, at least in
145. Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 129 (2015).
146. See Walker, supra note 120, at 1382–96 (reporting findings from an empirical study of the
role of federal agencies in the legislative process).
147. Walker, supra note 118, at 1048.
148. See id. at 1034–48; Walker, supra note 120, at 1398–1405.
149. ASIMOW, supra note 21, at 66 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 63–67 (detailing
adjudicator prohibitions on intra- and extra-agency ex parte communications).
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theory, should be able to leverage that expertise if desired. After all,
the attorney general is the head of the agency and could structure the
agency so as to interact with those legislative experts when exercising
final decisionmaking authority in immigration adjudication. Yet, as far
as we are aware, the attorney general does not consult with the
agency’s legislative experts when exercising adjudicative authority.
Indeed, a review of the attorney general’s referral-adjudication
decisions during the Trump administration reveals no express reliance
on the agency’s legislative experts when interpreting the INA.150
3. Craft Expertise. Even Professor Shapiro’s conception of “craft
expertise” seems to be lacking in the immigration adjudication
context.151 To be sure, through adjudicating hundreds of cases, BIA
members become specialists in interpreting the INA and immigration
law and policy more generally. In that sense, compared to federal
judges, these agency adjudicators may develop deeper “expertise in
reconciling and accounting for conflicting evidence and arguments,
disciplinary perspectives, political demands, and legal commands.”152
As noted in Part I.A.1, however, most of the statutory ambiguities
the BIA addresses in the INA do not implicate any technical or
scientific expertise. These are not the type of questions that involve
reconciling conflicting evidence or methodological approaches. They
are generally legal questions. Nor, as discussed in Part I.A.2, do BIA
members appear to interact with the rest of the experts at the agency.
In other words, the current organizational structure for immigration
adjudication does not engender “a richer, discursive decision-making
process” where “persons trained in various disciplines interact with
each other inside and outside of the agency to debate and dispute
arguments.”153
Perhaps more importantly, the comparative analysis here is not
just between the expertise of agencies and courts. Because this Article
recommends narrowing Chevron’s immigration domain to exclude
such deference in adjudication yet preserve it for rulemaking,
evaluating the comparative expertise exercised in those two modes of
agency action is important. Due to organizational structure, the BIA is

150. See supra note 84 (citing the fourteen attorney general certification rulings issued during
the Trump administration).
151. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
152. Shapiro, supra note 121, at 1099.
153. Id.
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likely unable to exercise the agency’s collective and diverse expertise
when adjudicating. In both adjudication and rulemaking, by contrast,
the attorney general theoretically has the ability to leverage the
agency’s collective expertise—whether that is technical and scientific,
legislative, or craft expertise—when interpreting statutes. So, at most,
when it comes to the attorney general as agency adjudicator, the
comparative value of the agency expertise for Chevron purposes is a
wash as between adjudication and rulemaking.
In reality, and as Part II.B details, because the notice-andcomment rulemaking process is designed to leverage agency and public
expertise, one would expect the attorney general to utilize agency
expertise more in rulemaking than adjudication. When assessing the
agency’s, or court’s, ability to leverage expertise, it is not just important
whether the agency interpreters have access to the agency’s relevant
expertise. Rather, it should matter whether the agency process is
structured to leverage the agency’s expertise and, ideally, also the
experience of outside experts, stakeholders, and the public. In other
words, the deliberativeness of the process matters. Part II.B turns to
this second theory for Chevron deference.
B. Deliberative Process
The Chevron decision itself did not focus on the value of the
deliberative process in developing statutory interpretations. But
subsequent decisions have underscored this comparative value for
agencies—rather than courts—being the primary interpreters of
statutes the agencies administer.154 As this Section explains, the
deliberative process theory for Chevron deference is interrelated to the
expertise theory and may just be another form of comparative
expertise. After all, agencies have flexibility to engage in a process that
incorporates all stakeholders, considers the various regulatory
alternatives, and leverages the agency’s and the public’s expertise on
the subject. Courts, by contrast, can only consider the cases before

154. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013) (“[T]he preconditions to
deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with
general authority to administer the Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication,
and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding that not all agency interpretations of
statutory ambiguities merit Chevron deference, but “recogniz[ing] a very good indicator of
delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed”).
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them, perhaps with limited amicus curiae input from others who are
not parties to the litigation.
But, as Professors Hickman and Nielson underscore, most of the
comparative value agencies possess when it comes to deliberative
process lies in rulemaking, not adjudication.155 For informal
rulemaking, the APA requires that the agency provide the public with
notice of the proposed rule and an opportunity to comment.156 The
proposed rule has to reflect considered judgment through weighing
regulatory alternatives, assessing the intended and unintended
consequences, and making the data supporting its proposed rule
publicly available.157 Before issuing the final rule, the agency must also
respond to material comments and may well end up adjusting the final
rule in light of those comments.158 Because the notice-and-comment
process is public, Congress, the president, the media, and other
interested groups can see what the agency is considering and raise
concerns before the agency finalizes its rule.159 This is, of course,
entirely different from the judicial process.
More importantly, notice-and-comment rulemaking is nothing
like the administrative adjudication process. As Professors Hickman
and Nielson observe, “a process that solicits comments and forces
agencies to engage with the views of the public should generally lead
to better policy outcomes,” such that the agency’s comparative
expertise at least partly “comes from the procedures that agencies are
required to use.”160 In contrast, they argue, “[a]djudications typically
involve only a narrow group of parties.”161 So as a matter of

155. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 965–68.
156. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2018).
157. In contrast to considered judgment,
an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Portland
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding the APA requires
agencies to disclose the technical data and studies on which they relied to draft the proposed rule).
158. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (“An agency must
consider and respond to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”).
159. See, e.g., Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 14–16 (2013).
160. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 966.
161. Id. at 967.
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deliberative process, it is difficult to see any meaningful daylight
between the judicial and administrative adjudicative processes.
Professors Hickman and Nielson argue, moreover, that judicial
deference-imbued policymaking through agency adjudication can raise
due process concerns that rulemaking does not necessarily implicate.162
The problem is one of unfair notice created by the retroactive
application of the policy created in the adjudication itself. To be sure,
the Supreme Court held long ago in SEC v. Chenery Corp.163 that
agencies, if permitted under their organic statutes, can choose to make
policy through either adjudication or rulemaking.164 But that does not
mean Chevron deference must apply to retroactive policies made
through adjudication. Retroactivity should caution against such
deference. Rulemaking, by contrast, is usually prospective.165 And even
when it is not, the agency still provides public notice of the proposed
rule and must consider public comments before the rule becomes
final—thus lessening the chance of unfair surprise to regulated parties.
In fact, in Kisor, the Court expressly reaffirmed a narrowing of
Auer’s domain in a similar fashion to exclude deference where the
regulatory interpretation lacked fair notice, such as “an interpretation
that would have imposed retroactive liability on parties for
longstanding conduct that the agency had never before addressed.”166
These due process concerns may be even more pronounced in the
immigration adjudication context, where liberty from detention and
removal is implicated. This may explain—as Professor Michael Kagan
argues—why the Supreme Court has refused to afford Chevron
deference in the immigration adjudication context when the agency
interpretations address detention or removal.167 Although beyond the
scope of this Article, there are unique harms that can flow from the
immediate and retroactive application of immigration adjudication
162. See id. at 971–77 (describing how adjudication can create policy that applies to past
actions, implicating the Due Process Clause).
163. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
164. Id. at 202–03.
165. Any authority to enact retroactive rules is narrowly construed:
Retroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their
language requires this result. By the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative
rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the
power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in
express terms.
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (citation omitted).
166. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019).
167. Kagan, supra note 23, at 495.
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decisions—an application that may well precede a federal court ruling
on whether the agency has it wrong or if Chevron deference is
unwarranted.
Indeed, the immigration adjudication context may even have less
deliberative and fair process than traditional APA-governed formal
adjudication or Article III judicial review. That is because immigration
adjudication, as detailed in Part I.A, does not happen before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Instead, it happens before an
immigration judge in a setting with fewer procedural protections for
the immigrants than in contexts where an ALJ presides.168 Also, the
history of political hiring, firing, and reassignment of BIA members
may affect their decisional independence. In June 2020, for example,
BIA members appointed before the Trump administration were told
they would be “reassigned” to other roles at DOJ after they rejected
offers to leave the agency altogether.169 The practice of removing BIA
members with differing political views is not new, tracing back to at
least 2003 when the attorney general shrunk the BIA from sixteen to
eleven members, firing the most “liberal” members on the Board.170 As
one former BIA chair has put it, the BIA is “not a court anymore. It’s
an enforcement mechanism . . . . They’re taking predetermined policy
and just disguising it as judicial opinions, when the results have all been
predetermined and it has nothing to do or little to do with the merits
of the cases.”171 These kinds of hiring practices and the shift in
adjudication from impartiality to predetermined policy hardly
encourage a deliberative and fair process or an effective leveraging of

168. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 19, at 148–57 (comparing APA-governed formal
adjudication with other administrative adjudications where a hearing is required by statute or
regulation).
169. Tanvi Misra, DOJ ‘Reassigned’ Career Members of Board of Immigration Appeals, ROLL
CALL (June 9, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/09/doj-reassigned-careermembers-of-board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/HJ53-CKVJ].
170. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration Board Asked To
Leave; Critics Call It a ‘Purge,’ L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
archives/la-xpm-2003-mar-12-na-immig12-story.html [https://perma.cc/S2G5-8PKU]; see also
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO
IMPROVE CASE M ANAGEMENT 20–47 (2003), http://files.dorsey.com/files/Upload/
DorseyStudyABA.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJC5-M8ZJ] (presenting findings regarding the 2002
“Procedural Reforms” at the BIA and including information garnered from interviews with past
and present agency officials and individual immigration lawyers and groups).
171. Felipe de la Hoz, The Shadow Court Cementing Trump’s Immigration Policy, NATION
(June 30, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/trump-immigration-bia [https://
perma.cc/D28L-YLG3] (reporting the comments of Paul Wickham Schmidt, who chaired the BIA
between 1995 and 2001).
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agency expertise. Rather, they expose the predominant role of politics
in immigration adjudication. Part II.C examines the proper role of
politics in this area.
Another way to gauge the deliberative process is to assess its
outputs. And the outputs in immigration adjudication do not portray a
well-functioning process, at least when it comes to consistency across
similar cases. For example, grant rates vary widely among immigration
judges. Empirical work by Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew
Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag reveals that asylum cases involving
similarly relevant facts still create a “refugee roulette” depending on
factors that include but are not limited to nationality, location, and
judge.172 To illustrate, they found that
in one regional asylum office, 60% of the officers decided in favor of
Chinese applicants at rates that deviated by more than 50% from that
region’s mean grant rate for Chinese applicants, with some officers
granting asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted
asylum in as many as 68% of their cases.173

TRAC Immigration has also produced empirical data that reveal the
large degree to which outcomes in asylum cases depend on the
immigration judge assigned to the case.174
This agency disorder has not gone unnoticed by federal judges.
Consider, for instance, Judge Richard Posner’s dissent in a case
involving an immigration judge’s denial of a continuance to allow a key
witness to appear: “Judges are not just umpires. Nor are the judicial
officers of the Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Judicial activism is deplored but there is such a thing as
excessive judicial passivity, which has been present at all levels of
adjudication of Bouras’s case.”175 When interviewed about the logic of

172. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372–78 (2007) (using a database of
judicial decisions and cross-referencing it to publicly available biographies of judges to identify
correlations).
173. Id. at 296.
174. To illustrate the disparity in outcome in the same court depending on the immigration
judge presiding in a given case, take the case of Newark immigration court: Between 2015-2020,
denial rates ranged from 20.7% to 93.1%. Immigration Judge Reports, TRAC IMMIGR., https://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports [https://perma.cc/N6FG-5CLQ].
175. Bouras v. Holder, 779 F.3d 665, 681 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J., dissenting); see also Cox,
supra note 113, at 1679–80 (discussing Judge Posner’s various opinions concerning the ineptitude
in the BIA, labeling the immigration courts’ decisions “arbitrary, unreasoned, irrational,
inconsistent, and uninformed” (footnotes omitted)).
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Chevron deference and the importance of federal courts, Judge Posner
remarked,
the performance of the immigration court and Board of Immigration
Appeals is frequently appalling, and likewise in Social Security
disability cases . . . . It would be a disaster to eliminate judicial review
in immigration and Social Security disability cases, and I imagine
likewise in the cases decided by other federal administrative
agencies.176

External factors contribute to this lack of deliberative process, and
thus the agency’s inability to leverage expertise via immigration
adjudication. As discussed in Part I.A, immigrants placed in removal
proceedings have no right to court-appointed counsel and might face
an immigration judge alone. In turn, geography greatly influences
access to counsel.177 Further, the Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and
Schrag study found:
[T]he chance of winning asylum was strongly affected not only by the
random assignment of a case to a particular immigration judge, but
also in very large measure by the quality of an applicant’s legal
representation, by the gender of the immigration judge, and by the
immigration judge’s work experience prior to appointment.178

The ability to ensure a deliberative process is also undermined by
the sheer volume of cases in the nation’s immigration courts, which at
the time of this writing exceeds one million.179 And it is further
176. Cohen et al., supra note 117.
177. See generally Eagly & Shafer, supra note 55 (presenting empirical disparities in attorney
resources along geographic lines); YOUSRA CHATTI & SARA FIRESTONE, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. AT THE PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF L., DETAINED IMMIGRANTS
AND ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN PENNSYLVANIA (2019), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/
files/PAFIUP%20Report%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5MX-CER2] (identifying how
disparities in representation can be impacted by factors such as the distance between detention
facilities and city centers).
178. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 172, at 296.
179. Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication Statistics: Pending Cases, New
Cases, and Total Completions, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (July 14, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1242166/download [https://perma.cc/9H5A-ESPZ]; see also
Sweeney, supra note 23, at 176 (“The immigration court system suffers from serious institutional
capacity challenges that compromise its decisionmaking and limit the time and consideration it
can give to any single case . . . . [T]he history of this dysfunction is longstanding . . . .” (footnote
omitted)). To be sure, this Article does not advocate shifting these one million agency actions
from adjudication to rulemaking. The number of cases designated as BIA precedent or a decision
by the attorney general for which the Chevron framework applies is much lower. As noted in Part
I.A, the attorney general issued fourteen certification rulings during the Trump administration,
see supra note 84, and the BIA has issued fewer than one hundred precedential decisions during
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exacerbated by the fact that immigration judges and BIA members
face pressure to meet quotas and follow guidelines set by the attorney
general.180 Insofar as adjudicative decisionmaking is influenced by
these factors, deliberative process and agency expertise are
undermined if not abandoned.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking, by comparison, contains many
of the procedural features worthy of Chevron deference that
immigration adjudication lacks. Even if rulemaking is imperfect, the
process of drafting the rule, explaining the background, and soliciting
input from the public creates a space for a rule to be finalized with
much more technical or other expertise than what might flow from a
BIA or attorney general adjudication. After all, intra-agency
coordination among various agency experts is commonplace in the
rule-drafting process,181 followed by the opportunity for robust public
input during the notice-and-comment period. Further, as one of us
(Wadhia) has argued, notice-and-comment rulemaking to establish
immigration policy at the agency level—in contrast to adjudication—
advances important values of public acceptability or buy-in, greater
consistency in outcomes, and widened transparency.182 Chevron’s
political accountability theory, which the next Section examines,
further implicates these values.

that same time period, see Volume 26, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Apr. 6,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/precedent-decisions-volume-26 [https://perma.cc/KDS64SPW] (reporting two precedential BIA opinions issued after January 20, 2017); Volume 27, supra
note 69 (reporting seventy-four precedential BIA opinions issued between 2017–2020); Volume
28, U.S. DEP’T JUST. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (last updated Jan. 8, 2021), https://
www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-28 [https://perma.cc/4J8C-CNYU] (reporting fifteen precedential
BIA opinions issued in 2020 and January 2021). Even fewer of these roughly thirty agency
adjudication decisions per year would likely shift to rulemaking, as the agency would
understandably pursue Chevron-less case-by-case adjudication for some policymaking.
180. See AM. BAR ASS’N J., EOIR PERFORMANCE PLAN, ADJUDICATIVE EMPLOYEES
(2018), https://www.abajournal.com/images/main_images/03-30-2018_EOIR_-_PWP_Element_3
_new.pdf [https://perma.cc/M68D-L55H] (outlining new quotas for immigration judges and the
number of cleared cases and decisions overturned on appeal rates to acquire a “satisfactory”
rating), discussed in Lorelei Laird, Justice Department Imposes Quotas on Immigration Judges,
Provoking Independence Concerns, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/justice_department_imposes_quotas_on_immigration
_judges_provoking_independe [https://perma.cc/7N3N-6P36].
181. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 118, at 1034–48 (documenting the roles of legislative history
and various agency actors in agency statutory interpretation).
182. WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 26, at 152; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L.
REV. 1, 27–32, 51–55, 57–64 (2012).
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C. Political Accountability
In addition to expertise, the Chevron Court itself advanced the
value of comparative political accountability as a reason for judicial
deference. As the Chevron Court noted, “Judges are not experts in the
field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.”183
Agencies, by contrast, are part of a political branch, the executive, and
report back to another political branch, Congress. “Courts must, in
some cases,” the Court continued, “reconcile competing political
interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy
preferences.”184 A federal agency, on the other hand, “may, within the
limits of that [congressional] delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
judgments.”185
Under the conventional account of Chevron’s political
accountability theory, immigration adjudication might have a very
strong claim to deference. After all, as noted in Parts I.A and II.A, the
attorney general has final decisionmaking authority over decisions
from immigration judges and the BIA. And the attorney general has
exercised that authority, especially in recent years, to shape
immigration policy at the agency level.186 The conventional account
seems to have force because the attorney general is indisputably more
politically accountable to the president and Congress than an Article
III federal court could ever be. And deferring to the BIA and the
attorney general would no doubt advance “the Chevron Court’s
express objective to reduce partisanship in judicial decisionmaking.”187
This conventional account, however, is incomplete on two related
grounds. First, as discussed above, the inquiry here is not just about the
comparative political accountability between agencies and courts but
also between the modes of agency action—adjudication versus
183. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See generally Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch
Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841
(2016) (documenting the history of the attorney general exercising powers over immigration
policy); supra Parts I.A–II.A (describing the attorney general’s role in immigration adjudication).
187. Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1524. One of us (Walker) has advocated, and continues
to believe, that Chevron’s critics “should more closely consider one significant and overlooked
cost: such reform could result in partisanship playing a larger role in judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations.” Id. It just turns out, as discussed in Part II.D, that the overall benefits
of eliminating Chevron in the immigration adjudication context outweigh these costs, especially
when immigration rulemaking would still receive Chevron deference.
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rulemaking. Policymaking through adjudication may not be an
adequate substitute for rulemaking under an “elections matter”
accountability theory. Second, political accountability should be
viewed in broader terms of democratic accountability and legitimacy.
Professor Jerry Mashaw has helpfully reframed the democratic
legitimacy debate by distinguishing between two types of
accountability: aggregative or electoral accountability, and deliberative
accountability.188 He argues that American democracy melds these two
distinct visions.189 Presidential administration can easily be understood
as advancing aggregative or electoral accountability in the
administrative state.190 Yet, he argues, the administrative state can and
should also advance deliberative accountability.191
When framed in terms of deliberative accountability, one quickly
sees how rulemaking better advances legitimacy than administrative
adjudication. Professors Hickman and Nielson nicely capture this
point: “A process that requires an agency to interact with broad
segments of society and explain why it has acted in view of concerns
raised by the general public, all else being equal, typically should yield
more legitimate outcomes.”192 In other words, Chevron’s political
accountability theory “presumably also comes from the procedures
that agencies must use, in addition to the fact that elections have
consequences.”193 As Professor Frankel explores, the attorney
general’s referral and final decisionmaking process lacks the hallmarks
of public engagement and transparency that are commonplace in
notice-and-comment rulemaking.194
In sum, if the choice is between rulemaking and administrative
adjudication in the immigration context, it is not a close call which
mode of agency action garners more accountability and thus
legitimacy. Both modes of agency action can advance aggregative or
electoral accountability, but rulemaking is much better at advancing
deliberative accountability.

188. JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
166–67 (2018).
189. Id. at 14.
190. Id. at 167.
191. Id. at 167–70.
192. Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at 967.
193. Id.
194. See Frankel, supra note 85, at Part III.C.
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D. Uniformity in Law and the Overall Cost-Benefit Analysis
A final, more recently developed rationale for Chevron deference
is that it promotes national uniformity in federal law by limiting courts’
responsibility for determining the best reading of a statute. Professor
Strauss is arguably the moving force behind this deference theory,
contending that because courts need only assess the reasonableness of
an agency’s interpretation, it is more likely that lower federal courts
across the country will agree in accepting or rejecting the agency’s
interpretation.195 In City of Arlington v. FCC,196 the Supreme Court
recognized this “stabilizing purpose of Chevron”: unlike “[t]hirteen
Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test,”
Chevron deference engenders predictability to agency statutory
interpretations and thus more uniformity in federal law.197 As an
empirical matter, this uniformity rationale for Chevron deference has
largely been borne out by decisions in the federal courts of appeals.198
The importance of uniformity in law may be at its apex in federal
immigration law. Uniformity is indisputably not better advanced
through judicial interpretation than agency statutory interpretation—
particularly in the modern era when the Supreme Court decides fewer
than one hundred cases per year.199 But again, the comparison is not
just between courts and agencies but between rulemaking and agency
adjudication. As to the latter, the question is a closer call. Adjudication
may allow the agency to move more swiftly to bring uniformity to
federal immigration law, especially when the circuit courts have
created inter-circuit disuniformity and the agency has a suitable case to

195. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121–
22 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases].
196. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
197. Id. at 307.
198. See, e.g., Barnett et al., supra note 109, at 1525 (concluding that “our findings do suggest
that Chevron creates a more favorable climate for nationwide uniformity that de novo or
Skidmore review cannot match”).
199. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 195, at 1121 (suggesting “that it is
helpful to view Chevron through the lens of the Supreme Court’s severely restricted capacity
directly to enforce uniformity upon the courts of appeals in those courts’ review of agency
decisionmaking”). In the October 2019 term, the Supreme Court issued just fifty-three signed
decisions—the fewest since 1862. Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2019
(Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (July 10, 2020, 7:36 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/finalstat-pack-for-october-term-2019 [https://perma.cc/LN83-6JT2].
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decide the issue.200 Notice-and-comment rulemaking generally takes
more time, so perhaps administrative adjudication—at least at the
margins—better advances Chevron’s uniformity theory. This may be
particularly true in the immigration adjudication context, where the
attorney general can expeditiously exercise her referral-and-review
authority to make the final decision for the agency.201
That administrative adjudication may better advance uniformity
in federal law than judicial review or even agency rulemaking,
however, should not be overemphasized. No judge, member of
Congress, or scholar likely views national uniformity as the exclusive
theory for Chevron deference. Instead, it is just one of at least four core
rationales. And some may not even consider uniformity to be a reason
for deference at all. At the very least, the costs and benefits of all
relevant values should be weighed together. As discussed in Part II.A
and as Professors Hickman and Nielson further elaborate, it is not a
close question whether agency adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking best leverages expertise. This case study underscores how
immigration rulemaking—as opposed to adjudication—better
leverages agency and public expertise, utilizes a more deliberative
process, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, better promotes democratic
accountability and public legitimacy.
Indeed, if we were pressed to weigh just the last two values—
accountability and uniformity—agency rulemaking would come out
ahead over administrative adjudication in the immigration context.
When the first two values are considered, the case against Chevron
deference in immigration adjudication becomes so clear as to justify
some course correction to narrow Chevron’s domain. Part III turns to
how to go about that reform.

200. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–
83 (2005) (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the
agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting
agency construction.”).
201. To be sure, the fact that policymaking via rulemaking often takes more time and
resources than policymaking via adjudication could result in immigration policy at the agency
level regulating less conduct than the INA permits. Cf. Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate:
Constraining the Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455, 495–97
(2020) (criticizing calls to eliminate Chevron deference as imposing an antiregulatory asymmetry
in administrative law). At least in the immigration context, we do not view the costs of this
potential underregulation to outweigh the various important benefits of narrowing Chevron’s
domain to rulemaking that Part II details.
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III. HOW TO NARROW CHEVRON’S IMMIGRATION DOMAIN
Part II demonstrated how Chevron’s theoretical foundation is
particularly weak in the immigration adjudication context, arguably
weaker there than in many other administrative adjudications where a
hearing is required by statute or regulation. The case to narrow
Chevron’s domain in the immigration context to just notice-andcomment rulemaking seems quite compelling as a normative and
theoretical matter. The resulting question is how to bring about this
reform. This Part focuses on three paths: the Supreme Court, Congress,
and the Executive Branch itself.
A. The Supreme Court and Stare Decisis
In their contribution to this Symposium, Professors Hickman and
Nielson powerfully argue that the Supreme Court should narrow
Chevron’s domain to exclude judicial deference for some, if not all,
agency statutory interpretations created via administrative
adjudication.202 Assuming the Court agrees that Chevron’s foundation
is unsound in the immigration adjudication context, stare decisis is still
a potent constraint. Hickman and Nielson argue, however, that stare
decisis should not control here, for three reasons.
First, they argue that the stare decisis claim is particularly weak in
the adjudication context because the Supreme Court has seldom
applied Chevron deference to adjudication, as opposed to rulemaking.
Second, the other traditional factors—the low reliance interests, the
judge-made nature of the doctrine, and the doctrine’s incorrectness in
the adjudication context—do not support keeping the precedent.
Third, various changed circumstances in the Court’s administrative law
jurisprudence—namely, that an agency statutory interpretation can
now trump a prior judicial interpretation and that the Court has
reiterated fair notice principles and retroactivity concerns in
administrative law—counsel revisiting Chevron deference in the
adjudication context.203

202. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 18, at Parts II–III.
203. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Randy Kozel advances a different
argument for why stare decisis should pose no barrier to overruling the Chevron decision if the
doctrine is based on a theory of congressional delegation: the precedent’s “combination of
exceptional breadth and intrusion upon interpretive choice places Chevron [as currently
theorized] beyond the domain of stare decisis.” Randy J. Kozel, Retheorizing Precedent, 70 DUKE
L.J. 1025, 1055 (2021).
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Fully assessing Professors Hickman and Nielson’s stare decisis
arguments exceeds this Article’s scope. But they present a compelling
case—one that seems to apply with similar force in the immigration
adjudication context. Litigants, scholars, and lower courts will surely
develop their argument further, and it merits serious attention from the
Supreme Court in an appropriate case.204 For the reasons presented in
this Article, immigration adjudication is arguably the best context
within which courts and litigants can build the case for narrowing
Chevron’s domain in the adjudication context.
B. Congress and Comprehensive Immigration Reform
The Supreme Court, of course, is not the only actor with the power
to narrow Chevron’s domain. The Court has emphasized that “[a]ll our
interpretive decisions, in whatever way reasoned, effectively become
part of the statutory scheme, subject (just like the rest) to congressional
change.”205 As noted in the Introduction, Republicans in recent years
have proposed legislation to amend the APA to eliminate Chevron
deference entirely.206 We highly doubt such sweeping legislative
proposals will garner the requisite bipartisan support any time soon.

204. Although scholars and judges may well reasonably disagree about the pull of statutory
stare decisis in this context, one of us (Walker) is not convinced that overturning this statutory
precedent would be consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis. Cf. Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1853, 1856–63 (2018) (defending qualified immunity for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
on statutory stare decisis grounds). To be sure, as a matter of first principles, Chevron deference
is likely not a proper interpretation of § 706 of the APA, for many of the reasons articulated by
Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908,
985–94 (2017). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1641–57 (2019)
(defending Chevron as a statutory precedent). And, Part II argued, the normative case against
Chevron in immigration adjudication is compelling. Despite these considerations, Chevron has
been the law generally since 1984 and in the immigration adjudication context specifically since
at least 1987, with the Court reaffirming the precedent numerous times. See supra Part I.B.
Importantly, moreover, there is strong evidence that Congress legislates against the backdrop of
the Chevron doctrine. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 118, at 995 (finding that the
congressional staffers surveyed “displayed a greater awareness of Chevron by name than of any
other canon in our study”). And the Court has recognized a strong presumption against
administrative law exceptionalism when interpreting the APA. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer &
Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 243–50
(2014) (arguing that the APA sets the default standards for judicial review of agency action when
an agency’s organic statute does not provide its own standard of review); cf. David S. Rubenstein
& Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 584–92 (2017)
(detailing how immigration law is already exceptional at the constitutional law level).
205. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).
206. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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And we are not convinced that eliminating Chevron deference for all
agency statutory interpretations would make for good policy.
But what Congress should do is surgically remove Chevron
deference for agency statutory interpretations made in immigration
adjudications yet preserve it for immigration interpretations
promulgated via notice-and-comment rulemaking. For the former
category of agency action, Congress should not command de novo
review but instead replace Chevron with the less deferential Skidmore
standard, which instructs courts to give weight to administrative
interpretations of law based on the “thoroughness evident in [the
agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”207 This shift from
Chevron to Skidmore, as Professor Strauss explains, is an important
move from a binding policymaking “space” where the agency’s
reasoning does not matter as much, to a nonbinding “weight” where
the agency’s position prevails to the extent it reflects special
expertise.208
This legislative change, moreover, would not be made to the APA
“superstatute” that governs the entire regulatory state.209 Instead,
Congress should amend the judicial review provisions of the INA. A
provision that narrows Chevron’s domain to just rulemaking under the
INA could be a minor detail as part of a larger immigration reform bill.
And it should garner at least some bipartisan support—from
Republicans who have long called for the elimination of Chevron
generally and from Democrats and Republicans who appreciate the
normative case against Chevron deference in immigration adjudication
in particular.
Such legislative reform would not be unprecedented. As Professor
Barnett details, Congress similarly “codified Chevmore” when it
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010.210 There, Congress targeted the judicial
deference the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
receives for its decisions that federal law preempts state consumer

207. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
208. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144–45 (2012).
209. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND.
L.J. 1207, 1209 (2015).
210. Barnett, supra note 28, at 10, 22–33.
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financial laws. For OCC interpretations preempting state law,
Congress replaced Chevron with Skidmore.211 And it included a savings
clause to make clear that the OCC should continue to receive Chevron
deference for all other statutory interpretations.212 Congress could
similarly codify Chevmore in the immigration adjudication context by,
for instance, amending the INA’s standard-of-review provisions for
removal orders.213
As Professor Barnett explores in greater detail, through
Chevmore codification “Congress can provide a ‘Chevron reward’ or a
‘Skidmore penalty’ in light of agency behavior.”214 By shifting to the
less deferential Skidmore standard for immigration adjudication, the
BIA and attorney general will face greater incentives to exercise
expertise, engage in reasoned decisionmaking, and perhaps “play it
safer” when interpreting the INA via adjudication.215 After all,
Skidmore focuses judicial review on the agency’s exercise of expertise
and reasoned decisionmaking.216 Failure to do so would risk judicial
invalidation of the agency’s statutory interpretation. To provide one
empirical snapshot, a study of all circuit court decisions citing Chevron
during an eleven-year period showed agency interpretations were
significantly more likely to prevail under Chevron (77.4 percent) than
Skidmore (56.0 percent).217
Because an agency is more likely to prevail in court under Chevron
than Skidmore, DOJ will also face incentives to move major
policymaking out of adjudication and into notice-and-comment
rulemaking, where the agency would still receive the Chevron reward.
Not only does this channel immigration policymaking at the agency
level to the more publicly transparent and accountable rulemaking
process, but it also encourages Congress to play a larger role in the
development of immigration law and policy. As Professor Barnett
211. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (2018) (instructing the reviewing court to “assess the
validity of [the OCC Comptroller’s] determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in
the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, [and] the consistency
with other valid determinations made by the agency”).
212. Id. § 25b(b)(5)(B).
213. See INA § 242(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (2018) (detailing the scope and standard of
review for judicial review of removal orders).
214. Barnett, supra note 28, at 51.
215. Cf. Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1384 (2013) (“The chance
of receiving more stringent review gives agencies an incentive to ‘play it safer’ when interpreting
statutes than they otherwise might.”).
216. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
217. Barnett & Walker, supra note 108, at 30 fig.1.
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astutely concludes, “Chevmore codification, like appropriations,
congressional oversight, sunset provisions, and confirmation for
agency officers, becomes another tool for congressional oversight of
agency action.”218
C. The Executive Branch and Internal Administrative Law
Narrowing Chevron’s domain in the immigration context does not
require judicial or congressional action. The Executive Branch can do
it unilaterally. The Supreme Court famously held in Chenery in 1947
that “the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency.”219 To be sure, there may be in
certain circumstances “a very definite place for the case-by-case
evolution of statutory standards.”220 The Chenery Court identified
three: (1) “problems may arise in a case which the administrative
agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved
despite the absence of a relevant general rule”; (2) “the agency may
not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant
rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule”; or (3) “the
problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be
impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule.”221
As Part II.A highlights, these circumstances will likely not present
themselves often in the immigration context. And when they do, the
BIA and attorney general should not categorically avoid utilizing
adjudication to engage in “case-by-case evolution of statutory
standards.”222 Instead, the argument here is that the Executive
Branch—through the attorney general and DHS secretary—should
shift the default to rulemaking for immigration policymaking.223 And

218. Barnett, supra note 28, at 56.
219. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (“Even apart from the
Administrative Procedure Act this Court has for more than four decades emphasized that the
formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which
Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judgments.”).
220. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.
221. Id. at 202–03.
222. See id.
223. Currently, the attorney general and the DHS secretary hold immigration policymaking
authority. See INA § 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall
establish such regulations, . . . review such administrative determinations in immigration
proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General
determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”); INA 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)
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when it is necessary to engage in adjudicative policymaking, the
attorney general should not seek Chevron deference for those statutory
interpretations but instead should ask the court to review the agency’s
interpretation under the less deferential Skidmore standard—or
perhaps seek no deference at all.
To be sure, whether an agency can waive Chevron deference is
hotly contested, with Justices Breyer and Gorsuch both suggesting last
year that Chevron is waivable.224 Even if a court will not honor Chevron
waiver, an agency can still choose to adjudicate with the assumption
that Chevron does not apply. There is some, albeit limited, empirical
support for the common-sense intuition that agencies are less
aggressive or more faithful to their statutory mandates if they believe
their statutory interpretations will not receive Chevron deference.225
And, as one of us (Walker) has counseled elsewhere, when waiving
Chevron deference, the agency “should not hold back on its Skidmore
analysis” but “utilize its ‘full panoply of Skidmore reasoning.’”226 In
other words, the agency should not only waive Chevron deference; it
should adjudicate in a way that would be more likely to withstand
judicial scrutiny under Skidmore.

(charging the DHS Secretary “with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all
other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,” but providing “[t]hat
determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be
controlling”).
224. See Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020) (writing for the
majority, Justice Breyer noted that “[n]either the Solicitor General nor any party has asked us to
give what the Court has referred to as Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute”);
Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., statement regarding the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit was
“mistaken” to hold that Chevron is not waivable and observing that “[t]his Court has often
declined to apply Chevron deference when the government fails to invoke it”); see also, e.g., James
Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183, 184 (2019)
(arguing against waiver); Jeremy D. Rozansky, Comment, Waiving Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
1927, 1930 (2018) (same); Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1520 (2019)
(same). See generally Kristin E. Hickman & David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 81 OHIO ST. L.J.
405 (2020) (summarizing the current debate in the federal courts on Chevron deference waiver).
225. See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 722–24, 722 fig.3 (2014) (reporting that two in five rule
drafters surveyed agreed or strongly agreed—with another two in five somewhat agreeing—that
a federal agency is more “aggressive” in its interpretive efforts if it is confident Chevron deference
applies, as opposed to the less deferential Skidmore standard or de novo review).
226. Christopher J. Walker, How To Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. 73, 80 (2013)
(quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1143
n.179 (2008)).
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The Executive Branch should go further than just reforming how
it makes policy via immigration adjudication. It should commit to
shifting major immigration policymaking away from adjudication and
into the realm of notice-and-comment rulemaking. The agency can
commit to this new process, without a congressional or judicial
command, via its discretion to create internal administrative law.227
Indeed, DOJ recently codified a similar procedural-channeling and
deference-limiting internal law in the context of agency guidance and
Auer deference to agency regulatory interpretations. In an interim final
rule promulgated in August 2020, DOJ set forth a number of rules and
procedures for creating agency guidance documents and instructed
that “[t]he Department shall not seek deference [in litigation] to any
guidance document issued by the Department or any component after
the effective date of this rule that does not substantially comply with
the[se] requirements.”228
At the same time, the president and Congress need not stand by,
waiting for this internal administrative law to develop organically. The
president should insist on this internal reform of anyone nominated to
serve as attorney general, and members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee can and should extract this commitment from the nominee
as part of the confirmation process.229 An early commitment by the
attorney general to shift major immigration policy to informal
rulemaking will encourage a shift internally. Moreover, legislating
Chevmore for immigration adjudication would create additional
“Chevron rewards” to incentivize the Executive Branch to make major
immigration policy through rulemaking.
As Professors Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack observe, “[t]he
constraints imposed by internal administrative law will be critical in
227. Internal administrative law broadly includes all “measures governing agency functioning
that are created within the agency or the executive branch and that speak primarily to government
personnel,” Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1239, 1251 (2017), all of which “share the fundamental characteristic of being implemented
from inside of agencies to control their actions and operations,” Christopher J. Walker & Rebecca
Turnbull, Operationalizing Internal Administrative Law, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1225, 1231 (2020).
228. Processes and Procedures for Issuance and Use of Guidance Documents, 85 Fed. Reg.
63,200, 63,202 (Oct. 7, 2020) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 50).
229. The president demanding this change in internal administrative law is consistent with
Professor Ming Hsu Chen’s call that the president should be the administrator-in-chief. See Ming
H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 351 (2017) (“The normative theory of the Administrator-in-Chief is that the
President is most justified when bolstering administrative procedure, with the effect of enhancing
perceptions of legitimacy by the agency officials who implement them, and increasing their policy
effectiveness.”).

WADHIA WALKER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1242

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/19/2021 5:11 PM

[Vol. 70:1197

resisting unlawful or excessive assertions of administrative power now,
just as they have been in the past.”230 Shifting from adjudication to
rulemaking for immigration policymaking at the agency level is just
one more example of the virtues of internal administrative law.231
CONCLUSION
When then-Judge Gorsuch remarked that Chevron deference is
the “elephant in the room,”232 many suspected that Gorsuch was
joining the call to eliminate Chevron deference entirely. That was
certainly the mood, at least from the Democrats on the Senate
Judiciary Committee at Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing. But a closer
look at the immigration context in which Gorsuch expressed those
concerns reveals that the theoretical foundations for Chevron
deference are perhaps most precarious with respect to immigration
adjudication. And narrowing Chevron’s immigration domain to just
rulemaking would not have the “titanic real-world implications on all
aspects of our everyday lives” that the senators worried about at
Gorsuch’s confirmation.233 To the contrary, shifting the default from
adjudication to rulemaking to establish federal immigration policy
would be more consistent with Chevron’s theoretical foundations—to
leverage agency expertise, to engage in a deliberative process, and to
increase political accountability.

230. Metzger & Stack, supra note 227, at 1248.
231. This shift to rulemaking in the immigration context should not be interpreted as granting
a blank check to the agency. Chevron deference still requires a court to find the statute “genuinely
ambiguous” and the agency’s interpretation “reasonable”—inquiries the Court has emphasized
are exacting. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–16 (2019). Moreover, the rulemaking must
withstand arbitrary and capricious review under the APA, which the Court in recent years has
suggested is a much “harder look” than those APA terms may suggest. Christopher J. Walker,
What the Census Case Means for Administrative Law: Harder Look Review?, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (June 27, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-census-case-meansfor-administrative-law-harder-look-review [https://perma.cc/ZX9U-7C67]; see also Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913–16 (2020) (holding that the
APA requires the agency to consider regulatory alternatives and reliance interests); Dep’t of
Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (holding that per the APA’s “reasoned
explanation requirement,” an agency must “offer genuine justifications for important decisions,
reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983) (articulating the APA’s reasoned
decisionmaking requirement).
232. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
233. Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); see
supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text.

WADHIA WALKER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/19/2021 5:11 PM

2021] CHEVRON FOR IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION

1243

In the lead article in this Symposium, Professors Hickman and
Nielson call on the Supreme Court to reconsider Chevron’s domain
when it comes to administrative adjudication. Such judicial attention is
merited, especially with respect to immigration adjudication where the
lack of agency expertise and deliberative process is glaring. But it is a
mistake to focus only on courts when it comes to immigration law and
policy. The political branches can and should act. Comprehensive
immigration reform should be a legislative priority, and Chevmore
codification in the INA should garner bipartisan support as part of any
such proposal. But the Executive Branch need not wait for Congress.
The attorney general, under the president’s direction if necessary, can
and should embrace this reform internally—by waiving Chevron
deference in immigration adjudication and by turning to rulemaking
instead of adjudication to make major changes to immigration law and
policy at the agency level.

